Free courses from beginner to professional: blockchain, TRON, stablecoins, security, price action, on-chain analysis, derivatives — and three-week programmes in crypto compliance, smart contract security and tokenisation. Lessons with pictures and real cases, quizzes, a final exam and a certificate you can share.
1LearnShort lessons with illustrations, a few questions to check yourself after each one.
2Pass the final exam20 to 30 questions, depending on the course. You need 80% to pass. The exam is free.
3Get your certificateIncluded in Pro and Max, $9 on the Free plan: your name, your score and an ID anyone can verify.
Courses
Certificates
A certificate with a verification ID
Pass a course’s final exam and you can get a certificate with your name, the course, your score, the date and a unique ID. Anyone can check it on this website.
Is the certificate an official qualification?
No. It shows that you completed a Striblo Academy course and passed its final exam. It isn’t an accredited qualification or a licence.
What does it cost?
The lessons and the exam are free. A certificate is included in Pro and Max, and costs $9 on the Free plan.
What if I don’t pass?
You see your score and the right answers, and you can try again after 24 hours. Each attempt draws a new set of questions.
How can someone check my certificate?
Every certificate has an ID such as SA-BB-2610-7K3QX9. Anyone can enter it under Verify on this page to see the name, course, score and date.
Do I need an account?
Yes — a free Striblo account. Your progress, exam attempts and certificates are kept with it.
What is a blockchain?
A blockchain is a record of transactions that is shared by many computers instead of being kept by one company. Everyone taking part has a copy, and new entries are only added when the network agrees on them.
A notebook everyone can check
Imagine a notebook in which every payment is written down. Instead of one bank keeping it in a vault, thousands of computers around the world keep identical copies. When someone wants to add a line, the others check it against their own copy first.
Every computer in the network keeps the same copy of the record.
Why that matters
No single owner.No one company can quietly change the record or switch it off.
Open to check.Anyone can look up a transaction and see that it happened.
Hard to change.Once an entry is settled, rewriting it would mean convincing most of the network at once.
Where blockchains are used
The best-known use is money that moves over the internet without a bank in the middle — coins such as bitcoin, and stablecoins such as USDT. Blockchains are also used to create tokens and to run small programs called smart contracts.
Key takeaways
A blockchain is a shared record kept by many computers.
New entries are added only when the network agrees.
That makes the record open to check and very hard to change.
Blocks, hashes and the chain
Transactions aren’t added one by one. They’re collected into blocks, and each block is locked to the one before it. That link is what makes the record so hard to tamper with.
What’s in a block
A block holds a batch of recent transactions, the time it was made, and a short code that points to the block before it.
Fingerprints called hashes
A hash is a short fingerprint calculated from data. Change even one character of the data and the fingerprint changes completely. Each block stores the hash of the block before it, so the blocks form a chain.
Each block carries the fingerprint (hash) of the block before it.
Why the past can’t be changed quietly
If someone edited a transaction in an old block, that block’s hash would change. The next block would no longer match it, and neither would any block after that. The rest of the network would see the broken link and reject the edited copy.
Change one old block and every link after it breaks.
Confirmations
Each new block added after yours is called a confirmation. The more confirmations a transaction has, the more settled it is. Services usually wait for a set number before they treat a deposit as final.
Key takeaways
Transactions are grouped into blocks.
Every block contains the hash of the block before it.
Changing old data breaks the chain, so the network rejects it.
Who keeps a blockchain running?
There’s no central server. A blockchain runs on computers called nodes, and a set of rules — the consensus mechanism — decides who adds the next block.
Nodes
A node is a computer that keeps a copy of the blockchain, checks new transactions against the rules and passes them on to other nodes. On many networks, anyone with the right software can run one.
Nodes pass transactions around; a validator adds the next block.
Agreeing without a boss
Because nobody is in charge, the network needs a fair way to choose who writes the next block — and to make cheating expensive. Two common approaches are proof of work and proof of stake.
Proof of work
Computers called miners compete to solve a hard puzzle. The winner adds the block and earns a reward. It’s very secure but uses a lot of electricity. Bitcoin works this way.
Proof of stake
Validators lock up some of the network’s coins as a deposit. They take turns adding blocks and can lose part of their deposit if they cheat. Ethereum works this way; TRON uses a version in which coin holders elect 27 validators.
Why many independent nodes matter
The more independent nodes and validators a network has, the harder it is for one party to block transactions or change the rules on its own.
Key takeaways
Nodes keep copies of the blockchain and check every transaction.
A consensus mechanism decides who adds the next block.
Proof of work uses computing power; proof of stake uses deposits of coins.
Wallets, keys and addresses
A crypto wallet doesn’t hold coins the way a leather wallet holds cash. The coins live on the blockchain; the wallet holds the keys that let you move them.
Private key and public address
Every account has a pair of keys. The private key is a secret number that signs your transactions — whoever has it controls the funds. From it comes a public address that you can share so that others can send you crypto.
Your private key signs; your address receives. Share the address, never the key or the recovery phrase.
The recovery phrase
Most wallets show the private key as a recovery phrase of 12 or 24 ordinary words. Anyone who knows these words can take everything in the wallet, so write them down offline and never type them into a website or share them with anyone.
Custodial and self-custody wallets
With a self-custody wallet you keep the keys yourself. With a custodial service such as an exchange, the provider keeps the keys and you log in with an account and a password.
Each blockchain has its own address format. A TRON address starts with T, many Bitcoin addresses start with bc1 or 1, and an Ethereum address starts with 0x. Sending to an address on the wrong network can mean losing the funds.
Key takeaways
The coins stay on the blockchain; your keys control them.
Share your address, never your private key or recovery phrase.
Each network has its own address format.
Sending a transaction
Here’s what happens between pressing Send and the money arriving.
A transaction’s journey, from your wallet to the blockchain.
Create and sign.Your wallet builds the transaction — amount, recipient and fee — and signs it with your private key.
Broadcast.The signed transaction is sent to nodes, which check the signature and that there are enough funds.
Wait in line.Valid transactions wait until a miner or validator puts them into a block.
Added to a block.Once it’s in a block, the transaction is part of the chain.
Confirmations.Every new block after it adds a confirmation, until the transaction is treated as final.
Network fees
Every transaction pays a small fee to the network for processing it. Fees depend on the network and on how busy it is. On TRON they’re paid with resources called bandwidth and energy, or in TRX.
A confirmed blockchain transaction can’t be reversed by the network. If you send to the wrong address, there’s usually no one who can send it back — so always check the address and the network first.
Key takeaways
You sign a transaction with your private key, and nodes check it.
It’s added to a block and then collects confirmations.
Every transaction pays a network fee, and confirmed transfers can’t be undone.
Coins, tokens and stablecoins
Not every crypto-asset is the same kind of thing. Knowing the difference helps you send the right asset on the right network.
Coins
A coin is a blockchain’s own currency: BTC on Bitcoin, ETH on Ethereum, TRX on TRON. It’s used to pay the network’s fees and to reward the people who keep it secure.
Tokens
A token is created by a smart contract that runs on an existing blockchain. USDT on TRON, for example, is a TRC-20 token. Tokens use the network they live on, so moving them still costs that network’s fees.
Tokens live on a blockchain; the blockchain’s own coin pays for moving them.
Stablecoins
Stablecoins are tokens designed to keep a steady value, usually one US dollar. They’re handy for moving money quickly, but they have their own risks, such as the issuer freezing tokens or the price slipping below its target.
The same token can exist on several blockchains — USDT, for example, is issued on TRON, Ethereum and others. These versions don’t mix, so always send on the network the recipient expects.
Key takeaways
A coin belongs to its blockchain and pays the network’s fees.
A token is created by a smart contract on an existing blockchain.
Stablecoins aim for a steady value but carry their own risks.
Smart contracts in plain words
A smart contract is a small program that lives on a blockchain and does exactly what it was written to do — every time, for everyone, without anyone pressing a button.
Like a vending machine
Put in the right coins, choose a drink, and the machine hands it over. Nobody behind the counter decides. A smart contract works the same way: when its conditions are met, it carries out its rules automatically, and everyone can see what happened.
A smart contract turns a condition into a result, following rules everyone can read.
What they are used for
Tokens.Every TRC-20 token, such as USDT on TRON, is a smart contract that keeps track of who holds how much.
Exchanges without a middleman.Some contracts swap one token for another at a price set by a formula.
Apps on the blockchain.Apps whose logic runs on smart contracts are called dApps (decentralised apps).
What to keep in mind
A contract does what its code says — including its mistakes. A bug can lock or lose funds, and code that’s live is often hard to change. In a self-custody wallet, approving a contract lets it move your tokens, so only approve contracts you trust, and only for the amount you need.
Key takeaways
A smart contract is a program on the blockchain that follows its rules automatically.
Tokens and many crypto apps are built from smart contracts.
Code runs as written, so bugs and careless approvals can be costly.
Risks and good habits
Blockchains are powerful, but they don’t forgive mistakes. A few habits protect you from most problems — and knowing the risks helps you decide how much to use.
The main risks
Prices move fast.Crypto-assets can rise or fall sharply, and you could lose some or all of their value.
Transfers are final.A confirmed transfer can’t be reversed, even if it went to the wrong address.
Scams target people, not code.Most losses start with someone being tricked into sending funds or sharing access.
No deposit guarantee.Crypto balances aren’t bank deposits and aren’t covered by deposit guarantee schemes.
Four questions that prevent most costly mistakes.
Habits that protect you
Use a strong, unique password and two-factor authentication. Check the network and every character of an address. Send a small test to new recipients. Never share your password, codes or recovery phrase. Be suspicious of urgency, guaranteed profits and messages you didn’t expect.
How much to use
Only put in what you can afford to lose, and don’t put all your money in one type of asset. Nothing in this course is investment advice — it explains how the technology works so you can make your own choices.
Key takeaways
Prices are volatile and confirmed transfers are final.
Most losses come from scams, so slow down and check.
Use only money you can afford to lose.
How the TRON network works
TRON is a public blockchain built for fast, inexpensive transfers. Its own coin is TRX, and a new block is added about every three seconds.
Who produces the blocks
TRON uses a form of proof of stake. TRX holders stake their coins and use the votes they get to elect 27 Super Representatives. These take turns producing blocks, and the votes are counted again every few hours, so a validator that does a poor job can be voted out.
TRX holders elect 27 Super Representatives, who take turns adding blocks.
Addresses and accounts
A TRON address starts with a capital T and has 34 characters. One address holds TRX and every TRON token at the same time. An address only exists on the network once it has received something.
Why stablecoins like TRON
Fast blocks and usually low fees made TRON one of the most used networks for moving stablecoins such as USDT. That popularity also attracts scammers — later lessons show how to move stablecoins safely.
Key takeaways
TRX is TRON’s coin; blocks come about every three seconds.
27 Super Representatives, elected by staked TRX, produce the blocks.
One T… address holds TRX and all TRON tokens.
Bandwidth and energy in practice
On TRON, fees are paid with two resources. Knowing how they work explains why some transfers cost more than others.
Two resources
Bandwidth pays for the size of a transaction in bytes. Energy pays for the work a smart contract does. A plain TRX transfer needs bandwidth only; a TRC-20 transfer such as USDT runs the token’s contract, so it needs energy as well.
A token transfer needs energy on top of bandwidth, so it usually costs more.
Staking or burning
Accounts that stake TRX receive bandwidth and energy in return. Each account also gets a small amount of free bandwidth every day. When an account doesn’t have enough of a resource, the network burns TRX from that account to pay for it.
What changes the cost
The kind of transaction.Contract calls such as token transfers use energy; simple TRX transfers don’t.
The recipient.Sending USDT to an address that has never held USDT needs more energy than sending to one that has.
Network settings.Resource prices are network parameters that TRON’s Super Representatives can change.
Many wallets and exchanges handle this for you: the network fee is shown on the review screen before you confirm.
Key takeaways
Bandwidth pays for bytes; energy pays for smart-contract work.
Resources come from staking TRX, or TRX is burned to cover them.
Token transfers, and first transfers to an address, usually cost more.
TRC-20 tokens: spotting the real one
Anyone can create a token on TRON and give it any name. The only thing that identifies the real token is its contract address.
Names can be copied, contracts can’t
A token’s name, symbol and logo are just labels chosen by whoever created the contract. Scammers create tokens called “USDT” and send them to many wallets. The real USDT on TRON is the contract below; anything else with the same name is a different token.
Same name, different contract: only the contract address tells them apart.
Habits for tokens
Check the contract.Compare the full contract address with an official source before you trust a token.
Ignore surprise tokens.Tokens you never bought, especially with a website in their name, are a lure. Don’t visit the link and don’t interact with them.
Mind the decimals.USDT on TRON has 6 decimals: 1 USDT is 1,000,000 of its smallest units. Wallets show the converted amount.
Approve carefully.In a self-custody wallet, approving a contract lets it move that token from your wallet, up to the amount approved.
Same token, other networks
USDT also exists on Ethereum and other networks, each with its own contract. A TRC-20 token can only move between TRON addresses — never send it to a 0x… address.
Key takeaways
The contract address, not the name, identifies a token.
Ignore tokens you didn’t expect and the links that come with them.
TRC-20 tokens move only between TRON addresses.
Stablecoins in depth
A stablecoin aims to be worth a fixed amount, usually one US dollar. How well it does that depends on what backs it and on the company behind it.
Three designs
What backs a stablecoin decides how it can fail.
Reserve-backed coins depend on the issuer holding enough safe assets. Crypto-backed coins hold more crypto collateral than the coins they issue, to absorb price swings. Coins kept stable only by a formula have collapsed in the past when confidence ran out.
What can go wrong
Losing the peg.If people doubt the backing, the price can fall below its target, briefly or for longer.
Frozen tokens.Many issuers can freeze the tokens at an address, for example at the request of law enforcement. This applies to USDT on TRON.
Issuer and reserve risk.You rely on the issuer’s reserves being real and sufficient, and on how openly it reports them.
Changing rules.Stablecoin laws differ by country and are changing, which can affect where a coin may be offered.
Reading the signals
Issuers publish reserve reports or attestations describing what backs their coins. They help, but they are statements at a point in time, not a guarantee. Stablecoins aren’t bank deposits and aren’t covered by deposit guarantee schemes.
Key takeaways
Stablecoins are backed by reserves, crypto collateral or only a formula.
Depegs, freezes and issuer risk are the main dangers.
Reserve reports help but don’t guarantee anything.
Moving stablecoins safely
Most losses with stablecoins happen in the few seconds before pressing Confirm. A fixed routine makes those seconds safe.
The routine
Agree on the network.Ask the recipient which network they expect — for example TRON (TRC-20) — and use exactly that.
Take the address from a trusted place.Use your saved address book entry, not your transaction history or a message.
Check every character.Look-alike addresses match at the start and the end and differ in the middle.
Send a small test.For a new recipient or a large amount, send a little first and wait for confirmation.
Read the review screen.Check the asset, amount, network fee and what the recipient gets, then confirm.
Address poisoning plants a look-alike in your history, hoping you’ll copy it.
Striblo’s safeguards
On an exchange, turn on the withdrawal whitelist if it offers one, so it only sends to addresses you’ve approved, and save the addresses you trust in your wallet.
Key takeaways
Agree on the network and take the address from a trusted place.
Check every character and send a small test first.
Use the address book and the withdrawal whitelist.
Reading a transaction on an explorer
A block explorer is a public website that shows everything on a blockchain. With a transaction hash, anyone can check whether a transfer happened and what it cost.
The fields that matter
An example transaction: the hash identifies it, the status and confirmations show it’s final.
Hash.The transaction’s unique ID. Share it when someone asks for proof of a transfer.
Status and confirmations.“Success” with confirmations means it’s settled and can’t be reversed.
From and To.The sending and receiving addresses. Check that To is the address you meant.
Token and amount.Which asset moved, and how much. For tokens, check the contract too.
Resources.The bandwidth and energy used, and any TRX burned to pay for them.
What you won’t see
Trades inside an exchange settle in its internal ledger, so they don’t appear on an explorer. Deposits and withdrawals do, because they move on the blockchain.
Key takeaways
An explorer lets anyone check a transaction by its hash.
Success plus confirmations means the transfer is final.
Internal swaps don’t appear on the blockchain; deposits and withdrawals do.
The threats you face
Attackers rarely break blockchains. They go after people — because crypto transfers are fast and usually can’t be reversed.
Four ways attackers try to get your access or your money.
How each one works
Phishing.A message or website copies a brand you trust to get your password, codes or recovery phrase.
Malware.Harmful software can record what you type or swap a copied address for the attacker’s (clipboard malware).
Social engineering.Someone builds trust or creates panic so that you send money or share access yourself.
SIM swap.An attacker convinces your mobile provider to move your number to their SIM, then receives your SMS codes.
Your best defence
Almost every attack needs you to act quickly. Slow down, and check anything unexpected through a channel you found yourself — the official website you type in, or the app you installed from the official store.
Key takeaways
Most crypto losses start with a person being deceived.
Phishing, malware, social engineering and SIM swaps are the main threats.
Slowing down and checking through official channels stops most attacks.
Recognising scams
Scams change their story, but not their pattern: an unexpected contact, a reason to hurry, and a request to send money or share access.
Three warning signs in one message. Real support never asks for codes.
Common scams
Fake support.Someone claiming to be from Striblo or another company asks for your password, a code or remote access.
Investment scams.Guaranteed high returns, “risk-free” trading bots or secret opportunities. Real investments always carry risk.
Giveaways.“Send 1, get 2 back” offers, often using a famous name. Nobody doubles your money.
Romance and fake jobs.A new online friend or employer builds trust for weeks, then asks for crypto or a fee to release your earnings.
What to do
Don’t reply, click or call back. Reach the company through its official website, which you type in yourself. Striblo will never ask for your password, 2FA codes or recovery details — anyone who does is not Striblo.
Key takeaways
Unexpected contact, urgency and a request for money or codes mean scam.
Guaranteed returns and “send to receive” offers are always scams.
Contact companies only through channels you found yourself.
Passwords and two-factor authentication
Your password and your second factor are the two locks on your account. Make both strong, and never hand either of them to anyone.
Strong, unique passwords
A strong password is long and used for one site only. When a website is breached, attackers try the leaked passwords everywhere else; a unique password stops that. A password manager creates and remembers a different password for every site, so you only need to remember one.
A unique password plus a code from an authenticator app.
Two-factor authentication
With two-factor authentication (2FA), logging in needs a code as well as your password. Codes from an authenticator app or a hardware security key are safer than SMS, because SMS codes can be stolen with a SIM swap. Striblo uses an authenticator app.
Backup codes and recovery
Keep backup codes offline, somewhere safe — they get you back in if you lose your phone. Never store them in a screenshot, a chat or your email. And never share a password or code with anyone: Striblo will never ask for them.
Key takeaways
Use a long, unique password for every site, kept in a password manager.
Turn on 2FA with an authenticator app rather than SMS.
Keep backup codes offline and never share passwords or codes.
Protecting your devices
Your phone and computer hold the keys to your accounts. A few settings make them much harder to attack.
Updated, uncluttered, locked, and only official apps.
Four habits
Install updates.Updates close security holes that attackers already know about. Turn on automatic updates.
Keep extensions few.A browser extension can read the pages you visit and change what you copy. Keep only the ones you trust and need.
Lock the screen.Use a PIN, fingerprint or face unlock, so a lost phone doesn’t become a lost account.
Use official apps only.Download apps from the official store or the provider’s own website. Fake apps copy real ones.
Two situations to avoid
On public Wi-Fi, avoid logging in to financial accounts, or use a connection you trust. And never install a remote-access app because someone asked you to “help” — it gives them control of your device, as if they were sitting in front of it.
Key takeaways
Keep your devices updated, with few extensions and a screen lock.
Install apps only from official sources.
Never give anyone remote access to your device.
A checklist for every transfer
A blockchain transfer can’t be called back. Thirty seconds of checking before you confirm is the best protection there is.
Tick off every line of the review screen before you confirm.
The checklist
Asset and amount.Is it the right token, and the amount you meant?
Network.Does it match what the recipient expects? The same token on another network can’t be received.
Fee.Is the network fee what you expect, and is the amount the recipient gets right?
The whole address.Compare every character with a trusted source, not just the start and the end.
Nobody rushing you.If someone is pressing you to send now, stop. That pressure is the warning.
Let Striblo help
Save trusted addresses in the address book, turn on the withdrawal whitelist so funds only go to addresses you’ve approved, and send a small test to new recipients first.
Key takeaways
Check asset, amount, network, fee and the full address every time.
Take addresses from your address book, never from history or chats.
Use the whitelist and send a small test to new recipients.
If something goes wrong
Acting quickly and in the right order limits the damage — and keeps you from falling for a second scam.
Five steps, in this order.
Stop.Don’t send anything else and stop talking to the person involved.
Secure your account.Change your password and set up two-factor authentication again. If you use the same password elsewhere, change it there too.
Contact Striblo support.Use the official website. Have the dates, amounts, addresses and transaction hashes ready — never your password or codes.
Report it.Report fraud to the police or the relevant authority in your country. A report creates a record and can help investigations.
Beware of recovery scams.People who promise to get your crypto back for an upfront fee are almost always scammers targeting victims a second time.
Be realistic
A confirmed blockchain transfer can’t be reversed by the network. Sometimes funds can be traced, and some issuers can freeze stolen stablecoins, but you shouldn’t count on getting them back. That’s why prevention matters so much.
Key takeaways
Stop, secure your account, contact support and report it.
Share facts such as hashes — never passwords or codes.
Anyone promising recovery for a fee is likely a scammer.
Candlesticks and timeframes
Price action means reading what the price itself has done — its opens, highs, lows and closes — rather than relying mainly on indicators. Everything starts with the candlestick.
Anatomy of a candle
Each candle sums up the trading in one period: where the price opened, the highest and lowest prices reached, and where it closed. The thick part, the body, spans the open and the close. The thin lines above and below, the wicks, reach the high and the low.
An up candle closes above its open; a down candle closes below it.
What the shape tells you
Large body, small wicks.One side was in control for most of the period.
Long upper wick.Price went up but was pushed back down before the close: sellers were active higher up.
Long lower wick.Price fell, but buyers pushed it back up before the close.
Small body, long wicks.Neither side won the period: indecision.
Timeframes
The same market looks different on a 15-minute, 4-hour, daily or weekly chart. A higher timeframe shows the bigger picture, and its levels usually matter more. A lower timeframe shows detail — and much more noise. Many analysts start on a higher timeframe to find the trend and the key levels, then zoom in for detail.
Key takeaways
A candle shows the open, high, low and close of one period.
Bodies show who controlled the period; wicks show prices that were rejected.
Higher timeframes give the bigger picture; lower ones show detail and noise.
Market structure: trends and ranges
Before you look for signals, decide what kind of market you’re in. Price moves in swings, and the pattern of those swings defines the trend.
Swing highs and swing lows
Price rarely moves in a straight line. It rises to a swing high, pulls back to a swing low and moves again. Comparing each swing high and swing low with the one before tells you the structure of the market.
The order of the swing highs and lows tells you which market you’re in.
Uptrend.Higher highs and higher lows: buyers keep paying more.
Downtrend.Lower highs and lower lows: sellers keep accepting less.
Range.Price swings between a ceiling and a floor without making new highs or lows.
When the structure changes
A trend is treated as intact until its structure breaks. In an uptrend, a close below the last higher low is a first warning that buyers are losing control; a lower high after that confirms the change. One break is no guarantee — markets often fake a break and then carry on.
Why it matters
Many methods that work in a trend fail in a range, and the other way round. Buying pullbacks can make sense in an uptrend; in a range, prices near the ceiling are often sold. Deciding the structure first keeps you from using the wrong tool.
Key takeaways
Higher highs and higher lows make an uptrend; lower highs and lower lows make a downtrend.
A range has a ceiling and a floor, and no new highs or lows.
Losing the last swing low or high is the first sign that the structure may be changing.
Support and resistance
Support and resistance are price zones where buying or selling has stopped a move again and again. They are where many traders make their decisions.
Zones, not exact lines
Support is a zone below the price where falls have stopped before, because buyers stepped in. Resistance is a zone above where rises have stalled, because sellers stepped in. Treat them as zones a little wider than a single price: markets often poke through a level by a small amount before they turn.
Each touch that holds makes a zone more visible to other traders.
What makes a level stronger
Several touches.A zone that has stopped the price several times is watched by more traders. But each test also uses up the orders waiting there, so a level can eventually give way.
A higher timeframe.Levels on daily and weekly charts usually matter more than levels on 15-minute charts.
Sharp reactions.A fast move away from a zone shows strong interest there.
Round numbers.Prices such as 1.00, 0.10 or 100,000 often attract orders.
Role reversal
When price breaks clearly through resistance, that zone often acts as support on the way back down — and broken support often becomes resistance. Traders who missed the first move, or who want to get out at break-even, place their orders there.
Key takeaways
Support stops falls and resistance stops rises — both are zones, not exact prices.
Higher timeframes, several touches and sharp reactions make a zone more significant.
Broken resistance often becomes support, and broken support becomes resistance.
Breakouts, false breakouts and retests
A breakout is price leaving a range or crossing a key level. Many breakouts fail, so the useful skill is telling a real one from a trap.
What a convincing breakout looks like
A close beyond the level.A candle that closes clearly through the zone — not just a wick that pokes through it.
Participation.Rising volume on the breakout candle shows that many traders took part.
Follow-through.The next candles keep going instead of falling straight back inside.
A retest that holds supports the breakout; a quick return inside the range points to a trap.
False breakouts
A false breakout moves through a level and then quickly returns. It often happens where many stop orders sit just beyond an obvious level: once those orders are triggered, the move runs out of fuel. Traders caught on the wrong side then have to get out, which can push the price hard the other way.
The retest
After a breakout, price often comes back to the level it broke. If the old resistance now holds as support, many traders see that as confirmation. Waiting for a retest means fewer trades and missing some moves, but it filters out many traps.
Patterns don’t predict. A breakout can fail even after a retest — that’s why every trade idea needs a point at which you accept you were wrong (see the last lesson).
Key takeaways
Look for a close beyond the level, rising volume and follow-through.
False breakouts often happen where many stop orders sit.
A retest that holds is a common confirmation — never a guarantee.
Candle patterns in context
Single candles and short candle patterns can show a change in control — but only where they appear decides whether they mean anything.
Four patterns worth knowing
The shape shows what happened in one or two periods — not what happens next.
Hammer.A small body near the top and a long lower wick: sellers pushed the price down, buyers pushed it back. Most meaningful at support after a fall.
Shooting star.The mirror image: a long upper wick and a small body near the low. Most meaningful at resistance after a rise.
Engulfing.A candle whose body completely covers the previous candle’s body in the other direction — a sharp change in control.
Doji.The open and the close are almost equal: indecision. On its own it says little.
Context beats the pattern
The same hammer means little in the middle of a range and much more at a tested support zone on a daily chart, in line with the bigger trend. Ask three questions: is it at a key level, which way is the higher-timeframe trend, and does the next candle confirm it?
Weak signal
A pattern in the middle of nowhere, against the higher-timeframe trend, on a 1-minute chart, with no confirmation.
Stronger signal
A pattern at a tested zone, in line with the higher-timeframe trend, on a 4-hour or daily chart, confirmed by the next candle.
Even good setups fail often. At best, a pattern shifts the odds a little; it never tells you what will happen.
Key takeaways
Hammers, shooting stars, engulfing candles and dojis show shifts in control.
Location, trend and confirmation matter more than the pattern itself.
No pattern predicts the future; at best it shifts the odds.
Volume and confirmation
Volume — how much was traded in a period — shows how many traders stood behind a move. Price tells you what happened; volume hints at how convincing it was.
The breakout had broad participation; the later rise has less and less.
Reading volume
Rising price, rising volume.Broad participation: the move has support behind it.
Rising price, falling volume.Fewer traders are pushing it; the move may be tiring.
A volume spike at a level.A burst of trading at support or resistance often marks a strong reaction, or the end of a sharp move.
A breakout on low volume.Less convincing, and more likely to fail.
Divergence
When price makes a new high but momentum or volume makes a lower high, the move is losing strength. That’s called a divergence. It’s a warning, not a timing signal: trends can keep going for a long time while they diverge.
Volume in crypto
Volume is split across many exchanges.One exchange’s chart shows only part of the market.
Reported volume can be inflated.Some venues have reported fake volume, so compare sources and focus on well-known markets.
Thin markets move easily.Small tokens with little trading can jump on a single large order, and their patterns are less reliable.
Key takeaways
Volume shows how much participation stands behind a move.
Breakouts on rising volume are more convincing; rises on falling volume may be tiring.
Crypto volume is spread across venues and can be inflated — compare sources.
Risk, position size and a trading plan
Reading charts is the smaller part of trading. Over time, results depend far more on how much you risk, where you accept you were wrong and whether you follow a plan.
Studies of retail day traders have repeatedly found that most of them lose money over time. Treat everything here as a way to understand and limit risk, not as a path to profit.
Decide where you’re wrong first
Before you enter, decide the price at which your idea is clearly wrong — for example just beyond the support zone you’re relying on. That’s where the stop-loss goes. Placing it by the chart, not by how much you’d like to lose, keeps it meaningful.
Position size comes from risk
Then choose a size so that, if the stop is hit, you lose only a small, fixed share of your account. Many professionals risk around 1% per idea.
Worked example
Account: $5,000. Risk per trade: 1%, which is $50.
Entry at $100, stop-loss at $95: the risk is $5 per unit.
Position size: $50 ÷ $5 = 10 units, a $1,000 position.
If the stop is hit, you lose about $50, plus fees and any slippage.
With a risk–reward of 1 : 2, you can be wrong more often than right and still break even — before fees.
Risk and reward
Compare the distance to your stop with the distance to a realistic target, such as the next resistance zone. If you risk $5 to make $10, you need to be right on more than a third of such trades to break even before fees. That isn’t easy: distant targets are reached less often.
A simple trading plan
Market and timeframe.What you trade, and on which charts.
Setup.The exact conditions for an entry: structure, level, confirmation.
Exits.Where the stop-loss and the target go, decided before you enter.
Size.How much of the account you risk per idea.
Review.A journal of every trade: why you entered, how it went and what you’d change.
On Striblo Intelligence
Striblo Intelligence is a data platform. It offers no trading of any kind, and nothing in this course is a recommendation to trade. You can follow prices, candles and volume on its Markets pages.
Key takeaways
Decide where your idea is wrong before you enter, and put the stop there.
Size each position so that a stop costs only a small, fixed share of your account.
Write a plan and keep a journal — results come from risk control more than from patterns.
UTXO and account models
Blockchains keep track of who owns what in two main ways. Knowing which model a chain uses explains what you see on an explorer — and what you can conclude from it.
The UTXO model
Bitcoin uses unspent transaction outputs, or UTXOs. Coins sit in separate pieces, like notes in a wallet. A payment spends whole pieces as inputs and creates new outputs: one for the recipient and usually one that returns the change to the sender, often to a new address.
A UTXO payment spends whole pieces and returns change; an account transfer moves value from one balance to another.
The account model
Ethereum and TRON use accounts. Each address has a balance that goes up and down, like a bank account. A transfer simply lowers one balance and raises another. Tokens are balances recorded inside each token’s smart contract.
What it means for analysis
Change outputs.On UTXO chains, one payment can show several outputs; working out which one is the change is a key part of tracing.
Address reuse.Account chains encourage using one address again and again, which makes activity easier to group — and privacy weaker.
Fees.On UTXO chains the fee is whatever the inputs exceed the outputs by; on TRON it’s paid with bandwidth, energy or burned TRX.
Key takeaways
UTXO chains such as Bitcoin spend whole pieces and return change; account chains such as TRON adjust balances.
Change outputs make UTXO tracing harder; address reuse makes account chains easier to follow.
Token balances on account chains live inside each token’s contract.
Inside a transaction: calls, events and internal transfers
On account chains, one transaction can do much more than move coins. An explorer shows it in layers, and reading them correctly is the core skill of on-chain analysis.
The top line says “to the USDT contract, 0 TRX”; the recipient and the amount are in the call and the event.
The layers
The transaction.Who signed it, which address or contract it called, the TRX value sent, the fee and the result.
The contract call.The function that was called and its inputs — for example transfer(to, amount) on a token contract.
Events.Records the contract writes while it runs. A token transfer writes a Transfer event with the sender, the recipient and the amount.
Internal transactions.Value moved by contracts calling other contracts, which doesn’t appear as a separate signed transaction.
Why the “To” field misleads
When you send USDT, the transaction goes to the USDT contract, not to the recipient, and its TRX value is zero. The real recipient and amount are in the contract call and the Transfer event. Reading only the top line is the most common beginner’s mistake.
Failed transactions
A transaction can be included in a block and still fail — for example when a contract runs out of energy. It still costs fees, but no tokens move. Always check the result, not just that a transaction exists.
Approvals
An approve call lets a contract move a token from your address later, up to an allowance. Unlimited allowances to unknown contracts are a common way wallets are drained. Explorers and wallet tools can show these allowances and revoke them.
Key takeaways
A transaction has layers: the call itself, the contract call, events and internal transfers.
For token transfers, the real recipient and amount are in the Transfer event, not in the To field.
Failed transactions still cost fees; approvals let contracts move your tokens later.
Following funds between wallets
Tracing means following value from address to address. Every step is public, but turning addresses into people or companies depends on assumptions that can be wrong.
Hops and paths
Each transfer is a hop. Funds are often split, merged and moved through many hops. Analysts follow the largest flows and the timing: amounts that leave one address shortly after arriving there are likely to be related.
Amounts and timing link the hops — the amounts don’t have to match exactly.
Grouping addresses
Common input.On UTXO chains, inputs spent together in one transaction usually belong to the same owner — but not in CoinJoin-style transactions.
Change detection.Working out which output is the change helps link a wallet’s addresses.
Deposit addresses.Exchanges often give each customer a deposit address that forwards funds to a central wallet; that pattern identifies exchange wallets.
Behaviour.Timing, amounts and fee habits can link addresses — the weakest evidence on this list.
Where tracing stops
Custodial services such as exchanges pool customer funds in shared wallets and keep track of ownership in an internal ledger. On-chain, you can see funds enter or leave the service, but not which customer they belong to. Mixers, cross-chain bridges and privacy tools break or blur the trail too.
A link between addresses is a hypothesis, not proof. Never accuse anyone, or act, on a trace alone.
Key takeaways
Tracing follows hops by amount and timing; funds are often split and merged.
Rules for grouping addresses are useful but can be wrong.
Custodial services, mixers and bridges hide who owns what — a trace is a hypothesis, not proof.
Exchange flows and large transfers
Large transfers and the flows in and out of exchanges are among the most watched on-chain signals. They can be informative — and they are easy to misread.
Inflows and outflows
Inflows to exchanges.Coins moving onto exchanges are often read as possible selling, because selling usually happens there.
Outflows from exchanges.Coins leaving exchanges are often read as moving into storage or self-custody.
Stablecoin inflows.Stablecoins arriving at exchanges can mean buying power waiting to be used.
Net flows swing both ways every day; one bar on its own says very little.
Why these signals mislead
Internal moves.Exchanges move funds between their own hot and cold wallets; if the labels are incomplete, that looks like inflows or outflows.
Not every transfer is a trade.Coins sent to an exchange may be used as collateral, lent out or simply stored.
Label coverage.Analytics only count the exchange wallets they have identified; unknown wallets are missing from the totals.
Hindsight.A big inflow before a fall is easy to spot afterwards; many similar inflows were followed by nothing.
Large transfers
Whale trackers show very large transfers. Many of them are exchanges, custodians or market makers moving their own funds, not one rich person. Read them as context, together with price structure and other data — never as a signal on their own. Striblo’s On-chain pages show large transfers and wallet activity, so you can practise reading them.
Key takeaways
Exchange inflows are often read as possible selling, outflows as moving into storage.
Internal exchange moves, incomplete labels and uses other than trading distort these signals.
Large transfers are context, not signals on their own.
Network activity and stablecoin supply
Beyond single wallets, on-chain data describes a whole network: how many addresses are active, how much value moves and how the supply of stablecoins changes.
Common network metrics
Active addresses.Addresses that sent or received in a period. One person can use many addresses, and one exchange address can stand for thousands of people.
Transactions and fees.How busy the network is. Low-fee networks such as TRON can show high counts from tiny or automated transfers.
Value transferred.The total moved on-chain. It includes exchanges moving their own funds, so it isn’t the same as economic activity.
Stablecoin supply
Issuers mint new tokens when customers deposit dollars and burn tokens when customers redeem them. A growing supply on a network suggests more demand for dollars on that chain; a shrinking one points to redemptions or moves to other chains. Mints and burns are visible on-chain as transfers from or to the issuer’s addresses.
Mints raise the supply on a network; burns lower it.
Making metrics meaningful
Compare like with like.Look at trends over weeks or months, not single days, and compare a network with itself.
Watch for distortion.Spam, airdrops and address poisoning can inflate the counts.
Combine sources.A metric that agrees with others is more trustworthy than one on its own.
Key takeaways
Active addresses aren’t users, and transferred value isn’t economic activity.
Stablecoin mints and burns show demand for dollars on a chain.
Read metrics as trends, check them for distortion and combine sources.
Limits, labels and wrong conclusions
On-chain data is public and permanent, but it doesn’t explain itself. The most damaging mistakes come from trusting labels and stories too much.
The chain records facts; everything on the right is interpretation.
Labels can be wrong
Labels such as “exchange”, “fund” or “scammer” come from analytics companies, explorers, public reports or the community. They can be out of date, incomplete or simply wrong. Treat an address without a label as unknown, not as a private person, and a label as a claim to check.
Common mistakes
Correlation taken as cause.Two things happening together doesn’t mean that one caused the other.
Cherry-picking.Choosing the examples that fit a story and ignoring the ones that don’t.
Forgetting off-chain activity.Trades inside exchanges and custodial ledgers never appear on-chain.
Look-alike addresses.Address poisoning plants addresses that share the first and last characters with real ones; compare full addresses.
Privacy and responsibility
Linking addresses to a real person can reveal their wealth and habits. Analyse responsibly: don’t publish personal conclusions, and leave investigations of crime to the authorities.
Key takeaways
The chain proves that a transfer happened, not who made it or why.
Labels are claims from third parties and can be wrong.
Watch out for correlation, cherry-picking and off-chain activity, and treat personal data with care.
Futures and perpetual contracts
A derivative is a contract whose value comes from something else — here, the price of a crypto-asset. Most crypto derivatives trading happens in perpetual futures.
Striblo doesn’t offer derivatives trading. Its Derivatives pages show market data from exchanges, and this course explains what that data means.
Futures
A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a set price on a set date. You don’t need to hold the asset: most crypto futures are settled in cash or stablecoins, paying out only the difference in price.
Perpetuals never expire; funding payments keep their price close to spot.
Perpetual futures
Perpetual futures, or perps, have no expiry date. To keep their price close to the spot price, they use a funding mechanism: regular payments between buyers and sellers, explained in lesson 4. Perps are the most traded crypto derivative.
Long, short and hedging
Long.You profit if the price rises and lose if it falls.
Short.You profit if the price falls and lose if it rises. Shorting lets traders bet on — or protect against — a falling price.
Hedging.A holder can open a short to offset falls in what they hold, reducing risk rather than adding to it.
Options, briefly
Options give the right, but not the obligation, to buy (a call) or sell (a put) at a set price. Buyers can lose at most what they paid; sellers can face large losses. Options are complex and beyond this course.
Key takeaways
Derivatives follow the price of an asset without you holding it.
Perpetual futures have no expiry and use funding to stay close to spot.
A long gains when the price rises, a short when it falls; a hedge reduces risk.
Leverage and margin
Leverage lets you open a position larger than the money you put up. It multiplies gains and losses by the same factor — and losses can arrive much faster than most people expect.
Margin and leverage
The money you put up is the margin. With 10× leverage, $100 of margin controls a $1,000 position. A 1% move in the price changes the position’s value by $10 — that’s 10% of your margin.
Worked example
Margin $100 at 10× leverage: a $1,000 position.
The price rises 5%: the position gains $50, which is +50% on your margin.
The price falls 5%: the position loses $50, which is −50% on your margin.
The price falls 10%: the loss is $100, your whole margin — in practice the position is liquidated before that.
The higher the leverage, the steeper the line — in both directions.
Initial and maintenance margin
The initial margin is what you need to open a position. The maintenance margin is the minimum you must keep. If losses push your margin below it, the exchange closes the position: a liquidation, covered in the next lesson.
Isolated and cross margin
Isolated margin.Only the margin assigned to that position is at risk.
Cross margin.Your whole account balance backs all positions: one losing trade can eat into the funds meant for the others.
Key takeaways
Leverage multiplies gains and losses by the same factor.
At 10×, a 10% move against you wipes out the margin — and liquidation comes earlier.
Isolated margin limits a position’s risk; cross margin puts the whole account behind it.
Liquidations
A liquidation is the exchange closing a leveraged position because its margin can no longer cover the losses. It happens automatically — often at the worst possible moment.
The liquidation price
Every leveraged position has a liquidation price. For a long, it lies below the entry; for a short, above it. The higher the leverage, the closer it is to the entry: at 10× it sits a little less than 10% away, at 50× less than 2%.
Roughly: the exact level also depends on the maintenance margin and fees, so liquidation comes a little earlier.
Why liquidations come in waves
When the price moves sharply, the first liquidations force the exchange to sell (for longs) or buy (for shorts) in the market. That pushes the price further and triggers the next layer of liquidations. These cascades cause many of the long wicks seen on crypto charts.
What happens to your money
You lose the margin.Most or all of the margin in the position is gone, and many exchanges charge a liquidation fee on top.
Insurance funds.Exchanges keep a fund to cover positions that close at a worse price than their liquidation price.
Auto-deleveraging.If that fund runs out, some exchanges reduce profitable traders’ positions to cover the gap.
Reading liquidation data
Striblo’s Derivatives pages show recent liquidations and heatmaps of estimated liquidation levels. Clusters of estimated levels can attract the price, because large liquidations add fuel, but they are estimates based on assumed leverage and change all the time.
Key takeaways
The higher the leverage, the closer the liquidation price is to the entry.
Liquidations push the price further and can trigger cascades.
Liquidation heatmaps are estimates, not a map of real orders.
Funding rates
Perpetual futures never expire, so something has to keep their price near the spot price. That something is funding: regular payments between longs and shorts.
How funding works
At set intervals — commonly every 8 hours, on some exchanges more often — traders on one side pay those on the other. When the perpetual trades above spot, the rate is positive and longs pay shorts. When it trades below spot, the rate is negative and shorts pay longs. The payments go between traders, not to the exchange.
Worked example
Position: a $10,000 long. Funding rate: +0.01% per 8 hours.
Each payment: $10,000 × 0.01% = $1, paid by you to the shorts.
Three payments a day: about $3 a day, or roughly $90 a month at this rate.
Funding usually leans one way for long stretches and flips when positioning changes.
What funding tells you
High positive funding.Many traders are paying to stay long. The market is crowded on one side, which can end in a squeeze of the longs.
Negative funding.Shorts are paying: bearish positioning, which can fuel a short squeeze if the price rises.
Near zero.Positioning is balanced.
Funding describes positioning, not direction. A crowded trade can stay crowded for weeks, and holding a position while paying funding is a cost that adds up.
Key takeaways
Funding keeps perpetual prices close to spot through payments between traders.
Extreme funding shows a crowded market, not when it will turn.
Open interest and long/short ratios
Open interest and long/short ratios describe how much money is in the derivatives market and how it is positioned. Combined with price, they give context — not predictions.
Open interest
Open interest is the total value of derivatives positions that are still open. It rises when new positions are opened and falls when positions are closed or liquidated. Every open contract has a long and a short side, so open interest shows how much is at stake, not which side is winning.
Price and open interest together hint at who is driving a move.
Long/short ratios
Exchanges publish the share of accounts, or of their top traders, holding more longs than shorts. Because every contract has both sides, a ratio above 1 doesn’t mean more money is long — it means more accounts are. Smaller accounts are often crowded on one side, which some traders read as a contrarian signal.
Putting it together
Rising open interest with high funding and a high long/short ratio describes a crowded, leveraged market in which a sharp move can trigger a cascade. None of it tells you when. Striblo’s Derivatives pages show these figures side by side for exactly this kind of reading.
Key takeaways
Open interest is the value of open positions; it rises with new positions and falls when they close.
Read it with price: who is opening and who is closing?
Long/short ratios count accounts, not money — and describe conditions, not timing.
Why leverage loses money — and how to limit the risk
Leveraged trading suits professionals with strict risk control, and most retail traders who use it lose money. Knowing why is the best protection.
Why leveraged traders lose
Small moves, big losses.Normal crypto price swings are enough to liquidate high-leverage positions within hours.
Costs add up.Trading fees, funding and the spread are charged on the full position, not on your margin.
Wicks and cascades.Brief spikes can liquidate a position even if the price later moves your way.
Behaviour.Chasing losses with more leverage turns a bad day into a lost account.
Worked example
Margin $1,000 at 20×: a $20,000 position.
An example trading fee of 0.05% to open and 0.05% to close: $20 in total.
That’s 2% of your margin gone before the price has moved at all.
Fees are a small share of the position but a large share of the margin.
If you use leverage anyway
Use low leverage.Lower leverage keeps the liquidation price far away.
Set a stop-loss before the liquidation price.Decide your exit in advance instead of letting the exchange decide it for you.
Use isolated margin.Keep each position’s risk separate.
Only risk money you can afford to lose.Assume any leveraged position could lose its whole margin.
Check the rules.Many countries restrict leveraged crypto products for consumers; the UK, for example, doesn’t allow crypto derivatives to be sold to retail consumers.
Striblo doesn’t offer leverage or derivatives. This course is general information, not investment advice.
Key takeaways
Fees and funding are charged on the full position, so they eat into the margin fast.
Wicks and cascades liquidate high-leverage positions even when the idea was right.
Low leverage, a stop before the liquidation price and isolated margin limit the damage.
Money laundering and the crypto risk landscape
Money laundering is the process of making the proceeds of crime look legitimate. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has estimated that 2–5% of world GDP is laundered every year. Crypto didn’t invent the problem, but it changed the tools — for criminals and for the people who catch them.
Three stages: placement, layering, integration
Classic anti-money-laundering (AML) training describes laundering in three stages. They apply to crypto almost unchanged.
Placement.Criminal money enters the financial system — for example cash used to buy crypto from an unregistered over-the-counter dealer, or a ransom paid directly in bitcoin.
Layering.The trail is blurred with many transactions: moving funds through dozens of wallets, swapping between tokens, bridging between blockchains or using mixing services.
Integration.The money comes back looking clean — sold for euros at an exchange, spent on property or cars, or passed through a business as fake revenue.
The three stages of laundering, with crypto examples.
Why crypto attracts criminals — and why it helps catch them
Crypto moves value across borders in minutes, without a bank, and addresses don’t carry names. That makes it useful for ransomware gangs, fraud networks and sanctioned states. But public blockchains also keep a permanent, public record of every transfer. Investigators can follow funds years later, which is rarely possible with cash.
Real case: the Bitfinex hack
In 2016, a hacker stole about 119,754 bitcoin from the exchange Bitfinex.
Over the following years the coins were moved through thousands of transactions, a darknet market, mixing services and exchange accounts opened with false identities.
In February 2022, US authorities arrested a New York couple and recovered about 94,000 of the stolen bitcoin — then worth around $3.6 billion. Both later pleaded guilty. Investigators had followed the trail on the blockchain itself.
The main threats a crypto business sees
Fraud and scams.Investment scams, “pig butchering” romance scams and fake support desks — often the largest source of illicit funds reaching exchanges.
Ransomware.Victims pay in crypto; criminals then try to cash out.
Hacks and thefts.Stolen funds from exchanges, bridges and DeFi protocols, a large share attributed to North Korean groups.
Sanctions evasion.Sanctioned people, companies and countries trying to use crypto to move money.
Darknet markets and terrorist financing.Smaller in value, but serious in harm.
Practice
Pick one of the threats in this lesson — for example ransomware — and write down how criminals would move through placement, layering and integration with crypto.
Then, for each stage, note one point where a crypto exchange could notice something: a deposit, a pattern, a withdrawal. Keep your notes; you will use them again in stage 2.
Key takeaways
Laundering follows three stages: placement, layering and integration.
Crypto is fast and borderless, but its public record lets investigators follow the money.
Fraud, hacks, ransomware and sanctions evasion are the main threats a crypto business must manage.
The rulebook: FATF, the EU and national supervisors
Anti-money-laundering rules for crypto come in layers: a global standard, laws that turn it into obligations, and national supervisors that check the work. Knowing who sets which rule is the first skill of a compliance professional.
The global standard: FATF
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental body that sets the global standard against money laundering and terrorist financing in its 40 Recommendations. In 2019 it extended them explicitly to crypto: virtual asset service providers (VASPs) — exchanges, custodians and similar businesses — must be licensed or registered, know their customers, monitor transactions, report suspicions and share sender and recipient information on transfers, the so-called Travel Rule. FATF doesn’t make law itself; countries are assessed on how well they implement its standard.
A global standard, laws that make it binding, and supervisors that enforce it.
The European Union
The Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive.Since January 2020 it has required crypto exchange services and custodian wallet providers in the EU to apply AML rules and register with a national authority.
MiCA.The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 has applied in full since 30 December 2024. Crypto-asset service providers need a licence, which can be “passported” to serve customers across the EU. Transitional periods for existing firms end by 1 July 2026 at the latest.
The Transfer of Funds Regulation.Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 has applied the Travel Rule to crypto transfers since 30 December 2024 — with no minimum amount.
The new AML package.The AML Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 will apply directly in every member state from July 2027, and a new EU authority, AMLA in Frankfurt, will supervise the riskiest firms directly.
National supervisors
In the Netherlands, crypto providers had to register with De Nederlandsche Bank under the Dutch AML act (Wwft) from 2020; under MiCA, the AFM grants licences. In the United Kingdom, crypto firms must register with the FCA under the Money Laundering Regulations. In the United States, crypto exchanges are generally money services businesses under the Bank Secrecy Act and must register with FinCEN, while OFAC enforces sanctions.
Worked example: which rules apply?
A crypto platform based in the Netherlands serves customers in Germany and Belgium.
It needs a MiCA licence (from the AFM), which it can passport to the other EU countries. It must apply EU AML rules, the Travel Rule from the Transfer of Funds Regulation and EU sanctions — and, if it also serves US customers, it has to consider US rules as well.
Rules change often and differ by country. This lesson describes the situation in 2026 in general terms; it isn’t legal advice.
Practice
Choose a country you know. Find out which authority supervises crypto firms there for AML, and whether firms need a licence or a registration.
Then write three lines: the global standard that applies (FATF), the law that makes it binding there, and the supervisor that enforces it. If the country is in the EU, add MiCA and the Transfer of Funds Regulation.
Key takeaways
FATF sets the global standard; since 2019 it covers virtual asset service providers.
In the EU, MiCA licenses crypto firms and the Transfer of Funds Regulation applies the Travel Rule with no minimum amount.
National supervisors such as the AFM, DNB, the FCA and FinCEN license, inspect and enforce.
The risk-based approach and the compliance programme
No firm can check everything with the same intensity. The risk-based approach — the core principle of FATF and EU law — means understanding where your risks are highest and putting the strongest controls there.
The business-wide risk assessment
Every firm starts by assessing its own exposure along four dimensions, and documents the result:
Customers.Private individuals or businesses, politically exposed persons, customers with complex ownership structures.
Products and services.Privacy coins, transfers to self-hosted wallets, high limits and instant withdrawals carry more risk than small, slow ones.
Channels.Online onboarding without meeting the customer, agents and partners.
Geographies.Countries on FATF’s lists of high-risk jurisdictions — for example North Korea, Iran and Myanmar, which are subject to a call for action — and sanctioned regions.
The risk-based approach in one line: inherent risk, minus controls, gives residual risk.
The building blocks of a compliance programme
Governance.A management body that owns the risk, and a compliance officer (often called the MLRO) with real authority and resources.
Policies and procedures.Written rules for onboarding, monitoring, sanctions, reporting and record keeping.
Controls.Customer due diligence, sanctions screening, transaction monitoring and the Travel Rule.
Training.Staff who know the red flags and know how to escalate.
Independent testing.Internal audit or an external review that checks whether the controls actually work.
Many firms organise this in three lines of defence: the business that owns and manages the risk, the compliance and risk functions that set rules and challenge, and internal audit that checks independently.
Real case: Binance, 2023
In November 2023, Binance pleaded guilty in the United States to violations including failing to maintain an effective anti-money-laundering programme, operating an unlicensed money transmitting business and breaking sanctions law. It agreed to pay about $4.3 billion, and its founder stepped down as chief executive and pleaded guilty himself.
According to the US Department of Justice, the exchange failed to report more than 100,000 suspicious transactions. The lesson for the industry: growth without a working compliance programme becomes a liability that can threaten the whole company.
Practice
Imagine a small exchange that lets EU customers buy USDT and TRX and withdraw to any wallet. Rate each of the four dimensions — customers, products, channels, geographies — as low, medium or high, with one sentence of reasoning.
Then name one control that would lower the highest risk you found, and say how you would check that the control actually works.
Key takeaways
The risk-based approach puts the strongest controls where the risk is highest.
A business-wide risk assessment looks at customers, products, channels and geographies.
A programme needs governance, policies, controls, training and independent testing — on paper and in practice.
Know your customer: due diligence and beneficial owners
Customer due diligence (CDD) answers three questions: who is this customer, who is really behind them, and what activity should we expect? The answers become the baseline against which every later transaction is judged.
The four steps of CDD
Identify.Collect the customer’s details: full name, date of birth, address and nationality — or, for a company, its legal name, registration number and address.
Verify.Check them against reliable sources: an identity document with a liveness check, company registers, and independent data.
Understand the relationship.Record the purpose and expected activity: occupation, expected amounts, where the money comes from.
Monitor.Keep the information up to date and compare activity with the profile for as long as the customer stays.
Onboarding ends in one of three outcomes, each recorded with its reasons.
Enhanced due diligence
Higher risk calls for enhanced due diligence (EDD): more evidence and senior approval. Common triggers are politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their close relatives, links to high-risk countries, complex ownership, unusually large amounts and activity that doesn’t fit the profile. EDD usually means documenting the source of funds — where this money comes from — and, for larger relationships, the source of wealth — how the customer built up their assets overall.
Business customers and beneficial owners
For a company, the real question is who owns or controls it. Under EU rules, anyone holding more than 25% of the shares or voting rights, or controlling the company in another way, is a beneficial owner and must be identified and verified. Shell companies, nominee directors and chains of holding companies in several countries are classic ways of hiding the people behind a business.
Worked example
A 24-year-old student opens an account and states that she expects to deposit about €200 a month from a part-time job.
In her second week, she deposits 40,000 USDT from a self-hosted wallet and asks to withdraw it straight away to another address.
The activity doesn’t match the profile. The firm pauses the withdrawal, asks where the funds came from and reviews the wallet’s history. If the explanation and evidence don’t hold up, the case is escalated as potentially suspicious.
Practice
Write an onboarding checklist for a small company customer: which documents you need, how you find the beneficial owners, and which answers would trigger enhanced due diligence.
Then take the student example from this lesson and list the three questions you would ask her, and the evidence that would satisfy you.
Key takeaways
CDD means identifying and verifying the customer, understanding the relationship and monitoring it.
Higher risk triggers enhanced due diligence, including the source of funds.
For companies, identify the beneficial owners — in the EU, everyone with more than 25% or control.
Sanctions screening on and off the chain
Sanctions forbid dealing with specific people, companies, countries — and, increasingly, crypto addresses. A firm must check both who its customers are and where their crypto comes from and goes to.
Who issues sanctions
The most important lists for crypto firms come from the United Nations, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC has added crypto addresses to its list of Specially Designated Nationals since 2018. In the US, civil liability for sanctions violations is strict: a firm can be penalised even if it didn’t know.
Where to screen
Sanctions screening happens at four points, not just at sign-up.
Name screening uses fuzzy matching, because names are transliterated and misspelt; every possible match must be reviewed and the decision recorded. Wallet screening checks counterparties against listed addresses and, with blockchain analytics, against addresses that are only a few hops away from a sanctioned entity.
Real case: Tornado Cash
In August 2022, OFAC sanctioned Tornado Cash, a mixing service on Ethereum, saying it had been used to launder more than $7 billion since 2019 — including hundreds of millions stolen by North Korea’s Lazarus Group.
The case was challenged in court. In November 2024, a US appeals court ruled that Tornado Cash’s immutable smart contracts weren’t “property” that could be sanctioned, and in March 2025 the Treasury removed the sanctions. For compliance teams the lesson is twofold: lists change, and mixer exposure stays a high-risk indicator even when it isn’t a sanctions breach.
Real case: Garantex and Russia
OFAC sanctioned the Moscow-based exchange Garantex in April 2022, and in March 2025 US and European authorities took down its websites. Since October 2022, EU sanctions have also banned providing crypto wallet, account and custody services to Russian nationals and residents.
North Korea and hacked funds
The FBI attributed the theft of about $620 million from the Ronin bridge in March 2022, and of about $1.5 billion from the exchange Bybit in February 2025, to North Korean hackers. Funds from such hacks are moved quickly through exchanges, bridges and over-the-counter brokers. Screening deposits for exposure to these clusters — and acting fast — is one of the most important things an exchange can do.
Practice
Open the public sanctions list search of the EU or OFAC and search for a common surname. Notice how many possible matches appear — and why fuzzy matching needs human review.
Then write a short rule for your team: what happens when a deposit comes from an address within two hops of a sanctioned entity, and who decides.
Key takeaways
Screen customers and wallets at onboarding, deposits, withdrawals and whenever the lists change.
OFAC lists crypto addresses, and US civil liability for sanctions breaches is strict.
Lists change — Tornado Cash was sanctioned in 2022 and removed in 2025 — so keep screening data current.
Transaction monitoring and blockchain analytics
Onboarding tells you who a customer is. Monitoring tells you what they actually do. In crypto, it combines classic rules on account activity with analysis of the blockchain itself.
Rules and scenarios
Monitoring systems run scenarios that raise an alert when activity matches a known risk pattern:
Pass-through.Funds are deposited and withdrawn again within minutes, using the account only as a stepping stone.
Structuring.Many amounts just below a reporting or review threshold.
Profile mismatch.Volumes far above what the customer said to expect.
Many to one.Many unrelated senders paying one account — a sign of a money mule or a scam collection account.
High-risk counterparties.Direct or indirect exposure to mixers, darknet markets, scam clusters or sanctioned entities.
FATF’s 2020 report on red flag indicators for virtual assets lists many more, from the use of several accounts with the same IP address to customers who can’t explain where large holdings came from.
Blockchain analytics
Analytics tools group addresses into clusters that probably belong to the same entity — for example because they are spent together as inputs of one Bitcoin transaction — and label clusters as exchanges, services or illicit actors. A risk score then measures exposure: direct, when the counterparty itself is risky, or indirect, when the funds passed through risky addresses a few hops earlier. Labels are estimates, not proof, so analysts must check them.
Most alerts turn out to be explainable. The skill is to close them well and to escalate the few that matter.
From alert to decision
Every alert is triaged, investigated if needed, and closed with a documented decision: no further action, ask the customer, restrict the account, or report. Supervisors look closely at quality: a backlog of unreviewed alerts, closures without reasons, or rules that are never tuned are among the most common findings in inspections.
Worked example: a customer who may be a victim
A 61-year-old customer who usually buys small amounts starts sending growing sums of USDT — 500, then 2,000, then 9,000 — to the same new address, which analytics links to a cluster of reported investment scams.
This is a classic pattern of a “pig butchering” scam, in which the victim is groomed online and then pushed to “invest”. The right response is to contact the customer through a known channel, warn them, pause further transfers where the terms allow, and report the scam address. Monitoring protects customers, not just the financial system.
Practice
Design one monitoring rule in plain words: what triggers it, the threshold, and what the analyst checks first. For example: “deposits withdrawn within 30 minutes, more than three times in a week”.
Then think of one legitimate customer who would trigger it — a false positive — and how the analyst could close that alert quickly with good documentation.
Key takeaways
Monitoring scenarios look for pass-through, structuring, profile mismatch, many-to-one flows and risky counterparties.
Blockchain analytics scores direct and indirect exposure, but labels are estimates to be checked.
Every alert needs a documented decision — and monitoring often protects customers from fraud.
The Travel Rule in practice
When a bank sends a wire transfer, information about the sender and the recipient travels with it. The Travel Rule requires the same for crypto transfers between service providers — even though the blockchain itself carries no names.
What has to travel
FATF Recommendation 16 requires the sending provider to collect and send information about the originator and the beneficiary, and the receiving provider to obtain and check it. FATF allows countries to apply simplified requirements below USD/EUR 1,000. The EU’s Transfer of Funds Regulation goes further: since 30 December 2024 it applies to every crypto transfer between providers, regardless of the amount. The data includes the originator’s name, account or wallet address and, for example, their address or date and place of birth, plus the beneficiary’s name and account or wallet address.
The information travels between the providers, off the blockchain, before or with the transfer.
How providers exchange the data
Providers use messaging networks and protocols to find each other and exchange the data securely. Most use a common data format, IVMS 101, so that a name or an address means the same thing in every system. Two practical problems remain: identifying which provider controls the receiving address, and the “sunrise issue” — some countries enforce the Travel Rule while others don’t yet, so a counterparty may be unable to receive the data.
Self-hosted wallets
When a customer sends to or receives from a self-hosted wallet, there is no second provider to receive the data. Under the EU regulation, the provider still records the information, and for transfers above €1,000 it must verify that the self-hosted wallet is owned or controlled by its own customer — for example with a signed message or a small test transfer.
Worked example
Anna, a customer of a Dutch provider, withdraws 2,000 USDT to Ben’s account at an exchange in Singapore.
Before the transfer, the Dutch provider identifies the receiving exchange, sends Anna’s and Ben’s details through a Travel Rule network and receives confirmation that the address belongs to Ben.
If the Singapore exchange can’t be reached or the data doesn’t match, the provider follows its written procedure: depending on the risk, it delays, rejects or returns the transfer — and records why.
Practice
Write down the data your firm would send for a 2,000 USDT withdrawal to another exchange: originator name, account, address or date of birth, beneficiary name and account.
Then decide what your procedure says when the receiving exchange can’t be identified, and when the transfer goes to a self-hosted wallet above €1,000.
Key takeaways
The Travel Rule requires sender and recipient information to travel between providers with each transfer.
In the EU, it applies to every crypto transfer between providers, with no minimum amount.
For self-hosted wallets above €1,000, EU providers must verify that the wallet belongs to their customer.
Investigations, reporting and tipping-off
When an alert can’t be explained, it becomes an investigation. When an investigation leaves a suspicion, it becomes a report to the national Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Doing this well — and keeping it confidential — is a legal duty.
Investigating a case
An investigator gathers the customer’s due diligence file, their full transaction history, an on-chain trace of the funds in question, open-source information and any earlier alerts. Questions to the customer are allowed and often useful, but they must not reveal that a report is being considered.
Reporting
The European Union.Suspicious transactions must be reported to the national FIU promptly. In the Netherlands, providers report unusual transactions to FIU-Nederland.
The United States.Money services businesses file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) with FinCEN for suspicious transactions of $2,000 or more, generally within 30 days of first detecting the facts.
The United Kingdom.Firms submit suspicious activity reports to the National Crime Agency.
A good report lets an investigator who has never seen the case understand it.
Tipping-off and record keeping
It is an offence to tell a customer, or anyone outside the people who need to know, that a report has been made or is being considered. Staff must handle questions from a customer about a blocked transfer carefully, using approved wording. Firms must keep due diligence records and transaction records — in the EU for five years after the relationship ends — so that investigators can reconstruct what happened.
Worked example: a report narrative
“Between 2 and 9 May, customer X (onboarded 14 April, stated income €1,800 a month, expected deposits under €500) received 31 USDT deposits totalling 48,600 USDT from 27 unrelated senders, and withdrew 47,900 USDT within an hour of each deposit to one self-hosted wallet.
Blockchain analytics links four of the senders to reported investment-scam victims. The customer did not answer our questions about the source of the funds. The pattern suggests the account is used as a money mule account.”
Practice
Using the money mule example from this lesson, rewrite the narrative for a different case: a customer who receives many small payments from scam victims and buys gift cards.
Check that your narrative answers who, what, when, where, why and how — and that it contains nothing that would tip off the customer if it were read aloud.
Key takeaways
Investigations combine the customer file, the account history, on-chain tracing and open sources.
Suspicions are reported to the national FIU; in the US, MSBs file SARs with FinCEN.
Never tip off the customer, and keep records — in the EU, for five years after the relationship ends.
Putting it together: a case study
This lesson walks through one case from the first alert to the final decision, using the skills from the whole course. The background is real; the platform and customer are fictional.
The background: the Bybit hack
On 21 February 2025, attackers stole about $1.5 billion in ether from the exchange Bybit by tricking the signers of a multi-signature wallet into approving a malicious transaction. The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea. In the following days, the stolen funds were split across thousands of addresses, swapped and bridged — mainly into bitcoin — and pushed towards exchanges and over-the-counter brokers. Analytics firms published the attackers’ addresses, and some exchanges and token issuers froze funds they could reach.
Day 1: the alert
At your platform, a deposit of 3.2 BTC from a new customer triggers an alert: analytics shows indirect exposure — two hops back — to a cluster labelled as Bybit hack proceeds. The customer was onboarded a week ago, stating “salary from IT freelancing” as the source of funds.
Every branch of the decision is documented, including the reasons for releasing funds.
Days 1–3: the investigation
Hold the funds.The deposit is credited to a restricted state while the case is open, as the terms of service allow.
Trace on-chain.The trace shows the coins left the hack cluster 40 minutes before reaching the customer, through one intermediate address and a cross-chain bridge — a typical laundering hop, not years of normal trading.
Check the customer.The ID was verified, but the stated freelance income doesn’t explain 3.2 BTC in the first week, and the customer can’t provide invoices or a history of the wallet.
Consider sanctions.Funds attributed to a sanctioned state’s hackers raise sanctions issues as well as money laundering ones; legal counsel is involved.
The decision
The suspicion isn’t dispelled. The compliance officer files a report with the FIU, keeps the funds restricted in line with the authorities’ instructions and legal advice, and makes sure no one tells the customer about the report. The case file records every step, every source and every reason — the file is what a supervisor or court will look at later.
Careers in crypto compliance
The work in this course maps onto real roles: KYC and onboarding analysts, transaction monitoring and blockchain investigation analysts, sanctions specialists, Travel Rule and regulatory reporting specialists, and the compliance officer or MLRO who is accountable for the programme. Since MiCA and the Transfer of Funds Regulation, demand for these skills in European crypto firms has grown.
Practice
Run the case again, but change one fact: the customer explains that the 3.2 BTC came from selling a car, and sends a sales contract and bank statements that check out — yet the coins still came from the hack two hops away.
Decide what you would do, write the reasons in four sentences, and note what you would keep monitoring. Then compare your answer with the decision path in the figure.
Key takeaways
Hack proceeds move fast; screening deposits and acting within hours matters.
Hold, trace, check the customer, consider sanctions — and document every step.
If the suspicion remains, report to the FIU and never tip off the customer.
How smart contracts get attacked
A smart contract is a program that holds and moves real value, runs in public and usually can’t be changed once deployed. Every one of those properties makes security harder than in ordinary software.
Why contracts are special targets
The code is public.Anyone can read a deployed contract and test attacks against a copy of the chain before spending a cent.
Value sits inside it.A bug doesn’t leak data — it lets someone take the money directly.
Transactions are final.There is no bank to call and no chargeback once funds are gone.
Contracts call each other.Composability lets DeFi protocols build on each other, but a weakness in one can be exploited through another.
Upgrades are hard.Immutable code can’t be patched; upgradeable code adds new risks around who controls the upgrade.
Most losses fall into five families. Only the first is a bug in the contract’s own logic.
Five families of attacks
Code bugs — such as reentrancy or a missing check — are the classic case. But many of the largest losses came from elsewhere: stolen or misused admin keys, prices fed into a contract that could be manipulated, economic designs that could be gamed with borrowed money, and even compromised websites and developer machines that tricked users into signing harmful transactions.
Real case: The DAO, 2016
The DAO was an investment fund run by a smart contract on Ethereum. In June 2016, an attacker used a reentrancy bug to drain about 3.6 million ether — roughly a third of its funds.
The Ethereum community responded with a hard fork that moved the funds back. A minority rejected the fork and kept the original chain, which continues as Ethereum Classic. The case still shapes how the industry thinks about immutability and intervention.
Real case: the Parity wallet library, 2017
In November 2017, a user of the Parity multi-signature wallet called an unprotected function on a shared library contract, became its owner and then destroyed it. Every wallet that depended on that library was frozen — more than 500,000 ether that could no longer be moved.
Practice
Pick a DeFi protocol you know and list its parts: the contracts that hold funds, the admin keys, the price sources, the website and the bridges it depends on.
For each part, write which of the five attack families from this lesson applies, and which part you would review first if you had only one day.
Key takeaways
Public code, locked-in value and final transactions make contracts prime targets.
Losses come from code bugs, keys and access control, oracles, economic design and compromised front ends.
The DAO and Parity cases show how one bug can affect a whole ecosystem.
Reentrancy and checks-effects-interactions
Reentrancy is the bug behind The DAO and still one of the most important to understand. It happens when a contract hands control to someone else before it has finished updating its own records.
The vulnerable pattern
This simplified vault lets users withdraw their balance. It sends the ether first and sets the balance to zero afterwards:
function withdraw() external {
uint256 amount = balances[msg.sender];
require(amount > 0, "nothing to withdraw");
(bool ok, ) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(""); // 1. send
require(ok, "transfer failed");
balances[msg.sender] = 0; // 2. update — too late
}
If the caller is a contract, sending ether runs its receive function. That function can call withdraw() again — and because the balance hasn’t been set to zero yet, the vault pays out the same balance a second time, and a third, until it is empty.
The external call lets the attacker re-enter before the vault has updated its records.
The fix: checks, effects, interactions
Order every function in three steps: first check the conditions, then update your own state, and only then interact with other contracts or send value.
A reentrancy guard — a lock such as the widely used nonReentrant modifier — adds a second layer by refusing nested calls. Watch out for cross-function reentrancy, where the attacker re-enters a different function that reads the not-yet-updated state, and read-only reentrancy, where another protocol reads a price or balance from your contract in the middle of an update.
Real case: Curve and the Vyper compiler, 2023
In July 2023, several Curve liquidity pools lost tens of millions of dollars. The contracts used reentrancy locks correctly — but three versions of the Vyper compiler had a bug that made the locks ineffective. Lesson: your security also depends on your tools, and on monitoring alerts about them.
Practice
Rewrite the vulnerable withdraw function in your own words as numbered steps, and mark the exact moment the attacker gets control.
Then design a second vulnerable example yourself: two functions, withdraw and transfer, that share the same balance — and explain how cross-function reentrancy would work and how the guard and the order of steps prevent it.
Key takeaways
Reentrancy happens when external calls are made before state is updated.
Follow checks, effects, interactions — and add a reentrancy guard.
Also consider cross-function and read-only reentrancy, and bugs in compilers and libraries.
Access control, upgrades and keys
Many contracts have powerful functions: minting tokens, pausing, changing parameters or upgrading the code. Whoever can call them effectively owns the protocol. Some of the largest losses in crypto came not from clever bugs but from this power falling into the wrong hands.
Missing or wrong checks
A sensitive function without a modifier such as onlyOwner can be called by anyone. Typical mistakes are initialisation functions that can be called a second time, functions marked public by accident, and checks that rely on tx.origin instead of msg.sender.
// Vulnerable: anyone can become the owner
function initialize(address newOwner) public {
owner = newOwner;
}
// Safer: can only run once
function initialize(address newOwner) public initializer {
owner = newOwner;
}
Upgradeable contracts
Proxy patterns let a team replace the logic behind a contract’s address. That makes fixes possible, but whoever controls the upgrade can also replace the logic with code that drains the funds. Proxies also bring technical risks such as storage collisions and uninitialised implementation contracts.
Admin power is safest when it needs several keys, waits for a delay and happens in public.
Keys are part of the code
Real case: Ronin bridge, 2022
The Ronin bridge for the game Axie Infinity needed 5 of 9 validator signatures to release funds. In March 2022, attackers gained control of five keys — four through one company’s compromised systems and one through an old permission that had never been revoked — and withdrew about $620 million.
Real case: Bybit, 2025
In February 2025, attackers compromised a developer machine of the wallet software that Bybit’s multi-signature cold wallet used. The website showed the signers a normal-looking transfer, while the transaction they signed actually changed the wallet’s logic. About $1.5 billion was taken. The signatures were genuine; what the signers saw was not.
Practice
List every privileged action a typical lending protocol needs: pausing, changing interest parameters, adding assets, upgrading the code.
For each, decide who should control it, how many signatures it needs and how long the timelock should be. Then ask: if one signer’s laptop were compromised, as at Bybit, what could the attacker do?
Key takeaways
Protect every sensitive function with correct, tested access checks — and make initialisers run only once.
Upgrades and admin roles need multi-signature control, timelocks and monitoring.
Key management and the signing interface are part of a contract’s security.
Oracles and price manipulation
Lending protocols, derivatives and stablecoins need to know prices. A contract can’t look them up on the internet; it relies on an oracle. If an attacker can move the price the oracle reports, they can borrow too much, liquidate others unfairly or mint assets cheaply.
The danger of spot prices
The simplest oracle reads the current price from a decentralised exchange pool. But a pool’s price is just the ratio of its two reserves, and anyone with enough capital can change that ratio inside a single transaction — buy a lot to push the price up, use the inflated price, then sell back.
Manipulating a thin market for a moment can be enough to fool a naive oracle.
Safer oracle designs
Time-weighted averages.A TWAP over several minutes or hours is much more expensive to move than a spot price.
Decentralised oracle networks.Many independent nodes report prices aggregated from many markets.
Sanity checks.Reject prices that are stale or move more than a set limit, and compare several sources.
Conservative risk settings.Lower borrowing limits and caps for assets with thin markets.
Real case: Mango Markets, 2022
In October 2022, a trader used two accounts on Mango Markets, a Solana trading platform, to drive up the price of its MNGO token in thinly traded markets. The inflated value of his position was used as collateral to borrow other assets, and the platform was left with losses of about $110 million.
Real case: bZx, 2020
In February 2020, the lending protocol bZx was hit by some of the first attacks that combined flash loans with price manipulation. They showed that an attacker no longer needs capital of their own to move a market — just a single, well-built transaction.
Practice
A lending protocol accepts a small token as collateral, priced from one exchange pool holding $400,000 of liquidity. Estimate roughly how much buying pressure would move its price by 50%.
Then propose three changes — to the oracle, the borrowing limit and a cap — and explain how each would have limited a Mango Markets-style attack.
Key takeaways
An oracle that reads a single pool’s spot price can be manipulated within one transaction.
Use time-weighted or aggregated prices, sanity checks and conservative limits for thin markets.
Mango Markets and bZx show how manipulated prices create bad debt.
Flash loans, front-running and MEV
Blockchains give anyone access to huge temporary capital and a public view of pending transactions. Both are features — and both change what an attacker can do.
Flash loans
A flash loan lets anyone borrow millions without collateral, as long as the loan is repaid within the same transaction. If it isn’t, the whole transaction is reverted as if it never happened. Flash loans are useful for arbitrage and refinancing, but they also mean that any weakness that “only” needs a lot of money can be exploited by anyone.
Real case: Euler Finance, 2023
In March 2023, an attacker used flash loans and a flaw in a donation function of the lending protocol Euler — it let an account give away collateral without checking whether its loan stayed healthy — to take about $197 million. After negotiations and public pressure, the attacker returned the funds.
Real case: Beanstalk, 2022
In April 2022, an attacker borrowed enough tokens with a flash loan to gain a majority of votes in the Beanstalk protocol’s governance, passed a proposal that sent its funds to themselves, and repaid the loan — all in one transaction. The protocol lost about $182 million. Governance that counts tokens held right now can be bought for a moment.
Front-running and MEV
Pending transactions wait in a public mempool before they are included in a block. Bots watch it and can place their own transactions before or after yours. The profit that block producers and bots can extract by ordering transactions is called maximal extractable value (MEV).
A sandwich attack: your own trade moves the price in the bot’s favour.
Defences
Slippage limits.Set a maximum price difference so a sandwiched swap fails instead of filling at a bad price.
Private transaction routes.Send transactions to block builders privately instead of through the public mempool.
Commit–reveal.For auctions and votes, first commit to a hidden choice, then reveal it later.
Snapshot-based governance and delays.Count votes from an earlier block and delay execution, so voting power can’t be borrowed for one transaction.
Practice
Write down, step by step, what the Beanstalk attacker did within one transaction: borrow, vote, execute, repay.
Then change the governance rules so the attack fails — for example by counting votes from an earlier block and adding a delay before execution — and check that each step of the attack would now break.
Key takeaways
Flash loans give anyone huge capital for one transaction, so every capital-hungry weakness is exploitable.
Public mempools enable front-running and sandwich attacks — MEV.
Use slippage limits, private routes, commit–reveal and snapshot-based, delayed governance.
Cross-chain bridges: the biggest targets
Bridges move assets between blockchains. They often hold enormous pools of locked funds and depend on complex message verification — which has made them some of the most attacked systems in crypto.
How a lock-and-mint bridge works
A user locks tokens in a contract on chain A. The bridge verifies the deposit and mints a wrapped version of the token on chain B. To go back, the wrapped tokens are burned on chain B and the originals released on chain A. The wrapped token is only worth something as long as the locked funds are safe and the verification can’t be faked.
The verifier is the heart of a bridge: whoever can fool it controls the locked funds.
Where bridges break
Real case: Wormhole, February 2022
A flaw in how the Solana side of the Wormhole bridge verified signatures let an attacker mint 120,000 wrapped ether without depositing anything — about $320 million at the time. A backer of the project replaced the missing funds so that the wrapped tokens stayed fully backed.
Real case: Nomad, August 2022
A routine upgrade of the Nomad bridge initialised a value in a way that made invalid messages look valid. Once the first attacker showed how, hundreds of addresses copied the transaction, replacing the address with their own. About $190 million was drained in hours — a “crowd-sourced” exploit.
Add the Ronin case from stage 1 — five of nine validator keys stolen — and the three main failure modes are clear: broken verification code, unsafe upgrades and too few or poorly protected signers.
What reduces bridge risk
Strong verification.Many independent signers, or cryptographic proofs of the other chain’s state.
Rate limits.Caps on how much can leave per hour, so an exploit can’t empty everything at once.
Careful upgrades.Reviews and tests for every upgrade, including how values are initialised.
Monitoring and pause.Watching for mints without matching deposits, with a way to pause quickly.
Practice
Draw a simple lock-and-mint bridge on paper: the lock contract, the verifier and the minting contract.
Mark where the Wormhole, Nomad and Ronin attacks hit. Then add two defences to your drawing — a rate limit and an alert for mints without deposits — and estimate how much of a $300 million pool a 1-hour rate limit of $5 million would have saved.
Key takeaways
Bridges hold large locked pools and rely on message verification.
Wormhole, Nomad and Ronin failed through verification bugs, an unsafe upgrade and stolen keys.
Strong verification, rate limits, careful upgrades and monitoring reduce the damage.
Secure development: tests, tools and standards
Audits catch problems late. Most security comes from how a contract is designed, written and tested before an auditor ever sees it.
Design for safety
Keep it simple.Every extra feature is more code to attack. Separate the parts that hold funds from the parts that change often.
Use audited building blocks.Widely used libraries for tokens, access control and reentrancy guards have been reviewed and battle-tested far more than new code.
Use a current compiler.Since Solidity 0.8, arithmetic overflow and underflow revert automatically — a whole class of older bugs is gone if you don’t switch the checks off.
Limit the blast radius.Caps, rate limits and pause switches limit how much one bug can cost.
Test like an attacker
Each layer catches different bugs; the most critical code gets all of them.
Unit tests.Cover every function, including the failure paths: what happens with zero, with the maximum, with the wrong caller?
Fuzz and invariant tests.Let a tool throw thousands of random inputs and sequences at the contract while checking properties that must always hold — for example, “the sum of all balances equals the tokens held”.
Static analysis.Tools such as Slither scan the code for known dangerous patterns in seconds.
Formal verification.For the most critical logic, mathematically prove that key properties hold for all inputs.
Worked example: an invariant
A lending protocol defines the invariant: “no account may end a transaction with debt larger than its collateral allows”.
A fuzzer calls deposit, borrow, donate and withdraw in random orders. If any sequence breaks the invariant, the test fails and shows the steps. A check like this targets exactly the kind of flaw behind the Euler exploit in stage 2.
Know the known bugs
Public catalogues of smart contract weaknesses, post-mortems of real exploits and the security sections of language documentation are the cheapest training a developer can get. Most exploits reuse ideas that were already public.
Practice
Write three invariants for a simple token vault: for example, the total of all balances always equals the tokens held; no user can withdraw more than they deposited; paused means no withdrawals.
For each, describe a random sequence of calls a fuzzer could try to break it, and which bug from stages 1 and 2 it would catch.
Key takeaways
Simple designs, audited libraries and a current compiler prevent many bugs.
Combine unit tests, fuzz and invariant tests, static analysis and, for critical code, formal verification.
Learn from past exploits — most attacks reuse known ideas.
How a security audit works
An audit is an expert review of a contract before — and sometimes after — it goes live. It finds many problems, but it is a snapshot of one version of the code, not a guarantee.
The stages of an audit
Scope.Agree exactly which contracts, which commit and which assumptions are covered.
Understand.Read the documentation, the tests and the intended behaviour, and build a threat model: who could attack, with what, to gain what?
Review.Read the code line by line, run tools, write proof-of-concept exploits for suspected issues.
Report.Each finding gets a severity, a description, the impact and a recommended fix.
Fix review.The auditors check that the fixes work and don’t introduce new problems.
A typical severity scale. Critical and high findings must be fixed before launch.
Example finding
High — Reward can be claimed twice through reentrancy in claim().
Impact: an attacker contract can call claim() again from its receive function before the reward is marked as paid, draining the reward pool.
Recommendation: mark the reward as paid before sending it (checks–effects–interactions) and add a reentrancy guard. Status: fixed in commit 4e1a9c, verified.
What an audit can’t do
It covers one version.Code changed after the audit — even “small” upgrades — isn’t covered. Nomad’s exploit came from an upgrade.
It has limited time.Auditors work for days or weeks; attackers have unlimited time once the code holds value.
It may exclude the rest.Keys, front ends, oracles and off-chain systems are often out of scope — yet Ronin and Bybit failed there.
Many teams therefore combine audits with more than one firm, public audit contests, and bug bounty programmes that reward independent researchers for responsibly reporting bugs after launch.
Practice
Write a finding in the format of this lesson for the vulnerable vault from stage 1: title with severity, impact, a short proof of concept in words, and a recommendation.
Then list three things outside the contract code that you would ask to add to the audit scope, and why — think of keys, oracles and the website.
Key takeaways
An audit runs from scope and threat model to review, report and fix review.
Findings are graded by severity; critical and high must be fixed before launch.
Audits cover one version within a scope — combine them with contests, bounties and monitoring.
Incident response: when an exploit happens
Exploits often unfold over minutes or hours. Teams that have prepared — with monitoring, a pause switch and a plan — can save funds that unprepared teams lose.
Before: prepare
Monitoring.Alerts for unusual withdrawals, mints without deposits, sharp changes in balances or prices, and admin actions.
Emergency controls.A pause function held by a multi-signature group that can act fast, with clear rules about when it may be used.
A runbook.Who is called, who decides, who talks to users — written down and rehearsed.
During: contain
A typical incident runs from detection to a public post-mortem.
Pause affected contracts, revoke compromised keys and approvals, and, if possible, move funds still at risk to safety. Tell users clearly what is happening and what they should do — for example revoking token approvals — without speculating. Share the attacker’s addresses with exchanges, stablecoin issuers and security groups, who may be able to freeze funds, and involve law enforcement.
After: recover and learn
Real cases: funds returned
After the Poly Network exploit in August 2021 — about $611 million taken through a flaw in how cross-chain messages could change the protocol’s keepers — the attacker returned almost all of it within weeks. After the Euler exploit in March 2023, the attacker returned the funds following negotiations. Offering a bounty for returning funds, combined with tracing and public pressure, has worked surprisingly often.
Real case: Bybit stays solvent
After losing about $1.5 billion in February 2025, Bybit kept withdrawals running, covered the gap with loans and purchases within days, and offered a bounty of 10% for funds recovered with the help of outside researchers. Fast, open communication helped prevent a run on the exchange.
Finally, publish a post-mortem: what happened, why, what was lost and recovered, and what will change. Honest post-mortems are how the whole industry learns — and many of the cases in this course are known because teams published them.
Practice
Write a one-page runbook for a small protocol: who is called first, who can pause, how users are told, which exchanges and security groups are alerted, and when the post-mortem is published.
Then rehearse it against one case from this course — Nomad or Euler — and note where your plan would have saved time.
Key takeaways
Prepare monitoring, emergency controls and a rehearsed runbook before launch.
In an incident, contain first, communicate clearly, and trace funds with exchanges and authorities.
Bounties, tracing and honest post-mortems have recovered funds and taught the industry.
What tokenisation is — and what it isn’t
Tokenisation means representing a right to a real-world asset — a fund share, a bond, gold in a vault — as a token on a blockchain. It has moved from pilot projects to products managed by some of the world’s largest asset managers.
The basic idea
A token is a record on a blockchain that says who holds what. For a tokenised asset, that record is linked to a legal right: ownership of a fund share, a claim on a bond issuer, or title to a bar of gold held by a custodian. The token makes the right easy to transfer and to program; the legal structure decides what the right actually is.
Three layers: the asset, the legal right, and the token that records it.
What tokenisation can improve
Settlement.Transfers can settle in minutes, around the clock, instead of in days through several intermediaries.
Programmability.Rules such as who may hold the asset, or how interest is paid, can be built into the token.
Access and fractions.Assets can be split into smaller units, lowering minimum investments where the rules allow.
Transparency.Supply and transfers are visible on the blockchain.
What it doesn’t fix
A token doesn’t make an illiquid asset liquid, doesn’t remove the need for a trustworthy custodian or issuer, and doesn’t change securities law. If the legal link between token and asset is weak, the token is just a number.
Real cases: tokenised money market funds
In 2021, Franklin Templeton’s OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund became the first US-registered mutual fund to use a public blockchain to process transactions and record share ownership; each share is represented by a BENJI token.
In March 2024, BlackRock launched its USD Institutional Digital Liquidity Fund (BUIDL) on Ethereum, tokenised by Securitize. It invests in cash and US Treasury bills, and passed $1 billion in assets within about a year — showing that tokenisation had reached the largest players.
Practice
Pick one asset you know — a government bond, a fund, gold or a building. Write down what tokenising it would improve, and what it would not change.
Then look up a tokenised fund such as BUIDL or Franklin Templeton’s fund and note three facts: what it holds, who can buy it, and on which blockchain it runs.
Key takeaways
Tokenisation records a legal right to a real-world asset as a token on a blockchain.
It can speed up settlement and make assets programmable and divisible.
It doesn’t create liquidity or remove the need for a sound legal link and a trustworthy custodian.
Which assets are being tokenised
Almost any asset can be tokenised in theory. In practice, a few asset classes lead — those where the benefits are clear and the legal path is well understood.
The main asset classes in tokenisation today.
Government debt and money market funds
Tokenised funds that hold short-term US government debt became the largest category in 2024 and 2025, with total assets in the billions of dollars. They pay a yield, are simple to value every day and are attractive as an on-chain place to park cash — including as collateral in crypto markets.
Private credit
Platforms bring loans to businesses on-chain and let investors fund them. The yields can be higher, but so is the risk: a token doesn’t make a borrower more likely to repay.
Real case: a default on-chain
In December 2022, a trading firm that had borrowed through pools on the Maple platform defaulted on about $36 million of loans after losses linked to the collapse of FTX. Lenders in those pools took losses. On-chain lending makes the loans visible — it doesn’t make credit risk disappear.
Commodities, bonds, real estate and equities
Gold.Tokens such as PAX Gold represent one fine troy ounce of gold held in professional vaults, with the issuer publishing regular reports on the holdings.
Bonds.Issuers from development banks to industrial companies have issued digital bonds directly on blockchains — stage 2 looks at two examples.
Real estate.Usually a company or fund owns the building and the tokens represent shares in it. Liquidity, valuation and local property law are the hard parts.
Equities.Tokenised shares are subject to full securities law, and products differ widely in what holders actually own.
Practice
Make a table of four tokenised asset types: treasuries, private credit, gold and real estate. For each, note the source of return, the main risk and how easily a holder could exit.
Then decide which one you would explain first to a cautious client, and why.
Key takeaways
Tokenised government debt and money market funds lead the market.
Private credit offers yield but keeps credit risk — the Maple default shows it.
Gold, bonds, real estate and equities follow, each with its own legal and liquidity questions.
Legal structures: who owns what
The most important question in tokenisation isn’t technical: what exactly does the token holder own, and what happens if the issuer or custodian fails?
Four common structures
Native digital securities.The law recognises the blockchain record itself as the register of the security — the token is the security.
Fund or company shares.A fund or special-purpose company owns the asset, and the tokens represent its shares or units.
Depositary or custodial claims.A custodian holds the asset, and the token is a claim to receive it or its value.
Contractual claims.The token gives a contractual right against the issuer — the weakest form if the issuer becomes insolvent.
A simplified view: the more the law recognises the token itself, the stronger the holder’s position.
Laws that recognise tokens
Germany.The Electronic Securities Act (eWpG) of 2021 allows bonds and some fund units to be issued as crypto securities registered on a blockchain.
Switzerland.The DLT Act of 2021 introduced ledger-based securities that can be transferred on a blockchain.
The European Union.The DLT Pilot Regime has applied since March 2023 and lets market infrastructures trade and settle tokenised securities under adjusted rules. MiCA, by contrast, doesn’t cover tokens that are financial instruments: tokenised securities fall under the existing securities laws.
Worked example: reading the terms
A token is marketed as “a share of a Rotterdam apartment”. The documents show the tokens are profit-participation rights in a company registered abroad, which owns the apartment.
Questions to ask: who are the company’s directors, can they sell the apartment, how are rents paid out, what happens to token holders if the company goes bankrupt, and is there a prospectus approved by a regulator? The word “share” in marketing settles none of this.
Practice
Take the Rotterdam apartment example and write the five questions from this lesson as a checklist.
Then find the documents of a real tokenised product and answer the checklist: what do holders own, who controls the asset, and what happens in insolvency? Note where the documents leave you unsure.
Key takeaways
What a token holder owns depends on the legal structure, not the technology.
Native digital securities give the strongest link; contractual claims the weakest.
Germany, Switzerland and the EU’s DLT Pilot Regime recognise tokenised securities; MiCA excludes them.
Token standards and permissioned tokens
An ordinary token can be sent to any address. A tokenised security usually can’t: the law requires the issuer to know who holds it, to block transfers to ineligible investors and to act on court orders. That needs a different kind of token.
From open tokens to permissioned tokens
Standards such as ERC-20 on Ethereum or TRC-20 on TRON define basic functions: balance, transfer, approval. Permissioned token standards add rules that are checked on every transfer. ERC-3643, for example, links each holder address to a verified identity and runs every transfer through a compliance module that can, for instance, allow only verified investors from certain countries.
Every transfer of a permissioned token is checked against identity and compliance rules.
Typical controls in a security token
Whitelists.Only addresses linked to verified investors can hold the token.
Transfer rules.Limits by country, investor type, holding period or maximum number of holders.
Freeze and forced transfer.The issuer’s agent can freeze tokens or move them, for example on a court order or after an investor loses their keys.
Recovery.A verified investor who loses a wallet can have the tokens reissued to a new one.
These powers are the opposite of “code is law” — and that is intended. A regulated security must follow securities law, and an investor who loses a key must not lose their legal ownership.
Worked example
A fund token may only be held by professional investors in the EU. Investor A, verified in the Netherlands, tries to send units to an address of investor B, who isn’t verified.
The compliance check fails, so the transfer is blocked on-chain — before any value moves. Once B completes onboarding and their address is linked to a verified identity, the same transfer goes through.
Practice
Design the transfer rules for a tokenised fund that only professional investors in the EU may hold: who may receive tokens, what is checked, and what happens on a failed check.
Then decide in which situations your issuer may freeze or force-transfer tokens, and who must approve it.
Key takeaways
Open token standards let anyone hold the token; securities usually can’t work that way.
Permissioned standards such as ERC-3643 check identity and compliance on every transfer.
Freezes, forced transfers and recovery are deliberate features of regulated tokens.
Custody, oracles and the link to the real world
A tokenised asset lives in two worlds: the token on the blockchain and the asset in a vault, a register or a bank account. The bridge between them — custody, reporting and data feeds — is where much of the risk sits.
Custody of the underlying asset
Someone must hold the real asset: a custodian bank for securities, a vault for gold, a fund administrator for a fund’s cash. Investors depend on that party being solvent, honest and legally separated from the issuer, so that the assets are protected if the issuer fails.
Attestations and audits
Issuers publish reports from accountants showing that the assets match the tokens in circulation. As with stablecoins, it matters whether a report is a full audit or a limited attestation, how often it appears, and what exactly it checks.
The link between the asset and the token runs through people, reports and data feeds.
Oracles for real-world data
Smart contracts that use tokenised assets need data from outside the chain: a fund’s net asset value (NAV) each day, the price of gold, interest rates, or confirmation that reserves exist. An oracle brings that data on-chain. If the data is wrong or late, a lending protocol might value the collateral incorrectly — the same oracle risk as in DeFi, applied to real-world prices.
Real case: gold tokens
PAX Gold is issued by Paxos, a trust company regulated in New York. Each token represents one fine troy ounce of a London Good Delivery gold bar held in professional vaults, and token holders can look up which bar backs their tokens. The token’s value depends on the vault, the issuer and the reports — not on the blockchain.
Practice
For a tokenised gold product, list everything a careful investor should check outside the blockchain: the vault, the custodian, the issuer’s licence, the type and date of the last report.
Then describe what an oracle should do if the gold price feed stops updating for an hour.
Key takeaways
A custodian holds the real asset; investors depend on its solvency and legal separation.
Attestations should show that assets match the tokens — check their scope and frequency.
Oracles bring NAVs and prices on-chain; wrong data creates real losses.
The lifecycle: issuance, servicing and redemption
A tokenised asset goes through the same life as a traditional one — it is issued, it pays income, it changes hands and eventually it is redeemed. The difference is that each step can be automated and settled on-chain.
The life of a tokenised asset, from onboarding to redemption.
Issuance
Investors are onboarded with KYC and eligibility checks. They pay cash — through a bank or with stablecoins — and the issuer mints tokens to their verified addresses. The register on the blockchain is updated at the moment the tokens are created.
Servicing and transfers
Interest, coupons or dividends can be paid automatically to every holder, in proportion to their tokens, often in stablecoins. Transfers between eligible investors settle on-chain. When both the asset and the payment are tokens, they can be swapped in one atomic transaction — delivery versus payment — so neither side can default halfway.
Redemption
At maturity or on request, the investor returns the tokens, the issuer burns them and pays out the cash value. For funds, redemptions are usually processed at the next net asset value.
Real case: the European Investment Bank, 2021
In April 2021, the European Investment Bank issued a €100 million two-year digital bond on Ethereum, working with Goldman Sachs, Santander and Société Générale. Payment was settled using an experimental central bank digital currency from the Banque de France. It showed that a top-rated issuer could run a bond’s register on a public blockchain.
Real case: Siemens, 2023
In February 2023, Siemens issued a €60 million one-year digital bond on the Polygon blockchain under Germany’s Electronic Securities Act. It was sold directly to investors without a central securities depository, and settled within two days.
Practice
Write the lifecycle of a one-year tokenised bond as a timeline: onboarding, issuance, four quarterly coupon payments and redemption.
At each step, note who acts, what happens on-chain and what happens off-chain — and where delivery versus payment would remove settlement risk.
Key takeaways
Issuance mints tokens to verified investors; redemption burns them and pays out.
Income can be paid automatically, and delivery versus payment can settle in one transaction.
The EIB and Siemens bonds show the lifecycle working with major issuers.
Secondary markets and liquidity
One of the most repeated promises of tokenisation is liquidity: that tokens of buildings or loans will trade as easily as shares. Reality is more complicated.
Why tokens don’t trade by themselves
Transfer restrictions.A permissioned token can only move between eligible investors, which shrinks the pool of buyers.
Licensed venues.Trading securities requires a licensed trading venue, such as a multilateral trading facility in the EU; many tokens have no such venue at all.
Valuation.Buildings and private loans are hard to value daily, so buyers and sellers disagree on price.
Fragmentation.The same kind of asset is issued on different blockchains and platforms that don’t connect.
A token inherits the liquidity of its asset — and of its exit route.
Where liquidity really comes from
The tokens that are easiest to exit are those the issuer redeems directly — such as money market fund tokens that can be redeemed for cash at the daily net asset value. Their liquidity comes from the redemption promise, not from a trading market. For assets without such a promise, a token may simply have no buyer at a fair price.
Tokens as collateral
A growing use of tokenised government debt is as collateral: trading firms and crypto platforms can post a yield-bearing fund token instead of cash or stablecoins. This is one of the clearest practical benefits so far — an asset that earns interest and can move at any hour.
Worked example
An investor holds tokens in a building worth €2 million, split into 20,000 tokens of €100. She needs her money back.
If the project has no redemption right and no licensed market, she can only sell to another eligible investor she finds herself — perhaps at a large discount. The token made her stake small and transferable; it didn’t create a buyer.
Practice
Compare two tokens: a money market fund token with daily redemption, and a property token without redemption.
For each, write how an investor would get €10,000 back within a week, what it could cost, and what could prevent it.
Key takeaways
Transfer rules, licensing, valuation and fragmentation limit secondary trading.
The most liquid tokens are those the issuer redeems directly at a daily value.
Tokenised government debt is increasingly used as collateral that earns interest.
The risks of tokenised assets
Tokenisation combines the risks of the underlying asset with the risks of the technology and of the structure that links them. Investors and builders need to look at all three.
A tokenised asset carries all three groups of risk at once.
Asset risks
The token doesn’t change the asset: a loan can default, a property can fall in value, a bond issuer can fail. Market and liquidity risk stay the same — or grow, if the token adds a layer of transfer restrictions.
Structural risks
Legal uncertainty.In some countries it isn’t clear whether the token or an off-chain register prevails if they disagree.
Custodian and issuer.If they fail, investors depend on how well the assets were separated.
Disclosure.Marketing may promise more than the documents give — as the “share of an apartment” example in stage 1 showed.
Technology risks
Smart contract bugs.The same risks as in DeFi: access control, upgrades, oracle manipulation.
Keys.The issuer’s admin keys — for minting, freezing and forced transfers — are high-value targets.
Chain risk.Congestion, outages or reorganisations on the chain the token lives on.
Real case: counterparty risk in 2022
In 2022, the failures of crypto lenders such as Celsius showed what happens when customers’ assets are pooled with a firm’s own: in January 2023 a US court ruled that assets in Celsius’s Earn programme belonged to the bankrupt estate. For tokenised assets the lesson is direct — read who owns the underlying asset if the platform fails.
This course explains how tokenisation works. It isn’t investment advice and doesn’t recommend any product. Striblo doesn’t offer tokenised securities or real-world asset tokens.
Practice
Pick a tokenised product and fill in the three groups of risk from the figure: asset, structure and technology. Give each risk a rating — low, medium or high — and one sentence of reasoning.
Then name the single question you would ask the issuer before investing a cent.
Key takeaways
Tokenised assets carry asset, structural and technology risks together.
The token doesn’t reduce credit or market risk; it can add liquidity limits.
Check custody, legal ownership in insolvency and the issuer’s admin keys.
Banks, central banks and the road ahead
Tokenisation is no longer only a crypto topic. Central banks, market infrastructures and the largest banks are testing how tokenised assets and tokenised money could work together.
Public-sector projects
Project Guardian.Launched by the Monetary Authority of Singapore in 2022, it brings regulators and financial firms together to test tokenised assets; an early pilot traded tokenised government bonds and currencies on a public blockchain.
Project Agorá.Started in 2024 by the Bank for International Settlements with seven central banks and dozens of private firms, it explores tokenised commercial bank deposits and central bank money on one shared platform for cross-border payments.
The EU DLT Pilot Regime.Since 2023 it has let market infrastructures trade and settle tokenised securities under a supervised exemption.
Banks and market infrastructure
Large banks run blockchain platforms for tokenised deposits and repo transactions — JPMorgan’s platform, renamed Kinexys in 2024, is one example — and securities depositories and exchanges are building tokenised settlement into their systems.
The full benefit appears when tokenised assets and tokenised money settle together.
What has to happen next
Tokenised money.Atomic settlement needs a cash leg on-chain: regulated stablecoins, tokenised deposits or central bank money.
Interoperability.Assets on different chains and platforms need to connect safely — without the bridge risks seen in DeFi.
Legal certainty.More countries need laws that recognise tokens as the legal record.
Standards and identity.Common ways to handle investor identity, eligibility and reporting across platforms.
Skills in demand
Tokenisation projects need people who understand both worlds: securities and fund law, custody and settlement, smart contracts and token standards, KYC and the Travel Rule. The combination — not any single skill — is what is scarce.
Practice
Choose one of the projects in this lesson — Project Guardian, Project Agorá or the DLT Pilot Regime — and read its latest public update.
Write a short summary: what was tested, who took part, what worked, and what problem remains. Then list which skills from this course a person would need to work on it.
Key takeaways
Central banks and large banks are testing tokenised assets and tokenised money together.
Atomic settlement needs a cash leg on-chain, interoperability and legal certainty.
The scarce skill is combining finance, law, custody and blockchain knowledge.
General information, not investment, legal or tax advice.